Seats/Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman
Minister of Energy, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Brief current as of September 2026 · Riyadh
Institutional brief
You are Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, Minister of Energy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. You have held the post since September 2019. The official ministry page still lists you in the office as of September 2026. This brief is current as of that date.
The playable case is a historical reconstruction of 5 October 2022, when you already held this office. You play the office.
What the office is
The minister sets Saudi crude-production policy and speaks for the Kingdom in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and in OPEC+. Saudi Arabia is the swing producer: it holds most of the group’s usable . Quotas are bargains. Members under-produce. Russia is the other large partner in the Declaration of Cooperation. The Crown Prince is the Kingdom’s principal on security and fiscal strategy. A minister who surprises him does not remain minister.
On 5 October 2022 the 33rd OPEC and non-OPEC Ministerial Meeting decided to cut overall production by 2 million barrels per day from August 2022 required levels, starting November. The United States had been releasing oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve () and lobbying against a cut ahead of midterm elections on 8 November. The White House called the decision shortsighted the same day.
What you can do
- Lead toward a 2 million barrel-per-day cut, a smaller cut, or a hold.
- Assign extra Saudi barrels to compensate for members who cannot cut because they are already below quota.
- Speak in public, or keep the argument with Washington in a quiet channel.
- Signal how much spare capacity the Kingdom will, and will not, use.
What you cannot do
- Order Nigeria, Angola, or others to produce barrels their fields are not producing.
- Set a global price as a number. U.S. shale, SPR releases, and demand still intervene.
- Ignore the Crown Prince on a decision that will be read in Washington as a political act.
- Reopen a strait or replace a security relationship with a communiqué.
Veto players
The Crown Prince and Royal Court; Russia and core OPEC+ partners; the United States as security partner and SPR operator; Aramco capacity and the Kingdom’s fiscal breakeven.
Two historical cases
Each tree is a documented crisis. Take one seat. Walk both files if you can.
The October Cut
5 October 2022: OPEC+ meets in Vienna. You must decide whether Saudi Arabia leads a 2 million barrel-per-day cut against U.S. pressure, midterm politics, and SPR releases.
Forks are the kinds of choices the office actually faced. The documented path is labelled in the rationale.
- — See OPEC+ as a Saudi–Russia bargain implemented through quotas, not a price-setting machine.
- — Distinguish a headline cut from August required levels from the smaller effective cut when members are already under-producing.
- — Place spare capacity as the swing producer’s real instrument.
What this case rests on
- 33rd OPEC and non-OPEC Ministerial Meeting, 5 October 2022: cut 2 million barrels per day from August 2022 required levels, effective November; extended Declaration of Cooperation through 31 December 2023.
- Official table: Saudi Arabia and Russia each assigned 526 thousand barrel-per-day reduction from 11.004 million barrels per day required levels.
- White House statement by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and NEC Director Brian Deese, 5 October 2022: called the cut ‘shortsighted’; announced further Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) release.
- Contemporaneous reporting: headline 2 million barrel-per-day cut; smaller effective cut because several members were already under-producing.
- Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman appointed Saudi Minister of Energy, September 2019 — still listed on the official ministry page in September 2026.
The Price War
March–April 2020: COVID-19 has crushed demand. Russia refused a cut. You must decide whether Saudi Arabia hikes and discounts, cuts alone, or fights until Washington helps close a record April deal.
Forks are the kinds of choices the office actually faced. The documented path is labelled in the rationale.
- — See OPEC+ quotas as bargains where refusal and cheating are normal.
- — Place the minister under the Crown Prince: you propose, the Royal Court owns the rupture.
- — Treat Russia as a veto partner, not a junior member.
What this case rests on
- 8th OPEC and non-OPEC Ministerial Meeting, 6 March 2020: ended without agreement on additional cuts — Russia refused deeper cuts.
- Russia’s Energy Minister Alexander Novak refused deeper cuts; Saudi Arabia raised output and cut official selling prices after the failed meeting.
- West Texas Intermediate (WTI) May 2020 futures printed negative on 20 April 2020 — after the 12 April OPEC+ deal — as Cushing storage filled.
- 9–12 April 2020: Mexico’s energy secretary Rocío Nahle refused a ~400,000 b/d Mexican cut; President López Obrador then agreed to 100,000 b/d after a U.S. political offset.
- U.S. President Donald Trump discussed calls with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and President Vladimir Putin before the April deal.
- 9th OPEC and non-OPEC Ministerial Meeting, 12 April 2020: record cooperative cut of 9.7 million barrels per day, effective 1 May 2020.