Seats/People’s Republic of China / Chinese Communist Party

Chairman of the Central Military Commission, People’s Republic of China / Chinese Communist Party
Brief current as of September 2026 · Beijing
You are Xi Jinping, Chairman of the Central Military Commission (). This brief is current as of September 2026. You still hold the usual three hats of the post-2012 centre.
The playable case is a historical reconstruction of early August 2022, when U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan.
In this system the same person is usually:
1. [[CMC]] Chairman — commands the People’s Liberation Army (). This is the gun. Theatre commanders take military orders through this chain.
2. General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) — sets cadre policy and the Politburo agenda. This is the Party. A CMC order that the Party centre does not own is a coup risk, not a ‘military option.’
3. President of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) — the diplomatic hat. Foreign leaders and the United Nations deal with the presidency. Joint communiqués are signed here.
Splitting those hats would be a succession crisis. Play the chair as one principal with three instruments, because that is how the office is built.
The CMC sits over the and, through the Chairman, over the that would fight a Taiwan campaign. You do not need a parliamentary war powers statute. You do need logistics, a theatre commander who can execute, and a Party line that cadres can repeat.
CMC vice chairs and the ; the Politburo Standing Committee as the Party centre that must carry a crisis; the PLA Rocket Force and Navy as the tools that can fire or misfire; the United States and Taiwan, who chose the visit’s timing.
Each tree is a documented crisis. Take one seat. Walk both files if you can.
Early August 2022: House Speaker Nancy Pelosi is flying to Taiwan. The CMC chair must set the scale of the PLA answer, and whether the flight itself is allowed to land.
Forks are the kinds of choices the office actually faced. The documented path is labelled in the rationale.
What this case rests on
12 July 2016: the Permanent Court of Arbitration rules against China’s nine-dash line claims. You must decide whether to reject the award, split diplomatic and military voices, and manage U.S. patrols and ASEAN.
Forks are the kinds of choices the office actually faced. The documented path is labelled in the rationale.
What this case rests on