Leadership Seat

Seats/Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Kevin Warsh at his Federal Reserve Chair swearing-in, White House, 22 May 2026

Kevin Warsh

Chair, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Brief current as of September 2026 · Washington, D.C.

Institutional brief

You are Kevin Warsh, Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. You were sworn on 22 May 2026. Jerome H. Powell’s term as Chair ended 15 May 2026. The Board named Powell chair pro tempore until you took the oath. This brief is current as of September 2026.

The playable case is a historical reconstruction of 10–13 March 2023, when Powell held the chair. You play the office as it existed that weekend.

What the office is

The Chair convenes the Federal Open Market Committee () and frames the federal funds rate, the balance sheet, and emergency facilities. The Chair has one vote. The Committee decides. The is maximum employment and stable prices.

In a bank-run weekend the Board also votes on two other instruments: ordinary credit, and emergency lending under of the Federal Reserve Act (which needs the Treasury Secretary’s written approval). The Board can recommend, with the , a systemic-risk exception so uninsured deposits can be protected. That exception is a legal act the Secretary of the Treasury signs after consulting the President. It sits with Treasury and the FDIC.

What you can do

  • Propose a 13(3) program such as the Bank Term Funding Program ().
  • Keep the discount window open and change how collateral is valued for a time.
  • Vote, as Chair of the Board, to recommend a systemic-risk exception jointly with the FDIC.
  • Set the public line at the next FOMC meeting, including whether to raise, hold, or cut the funds rate while inflation is still high.
  • Speak alone, or join Treasury and the FDIC in one statement.

What you cannot do

  • Set the funds rate by personal decree. The FOMC votes.
  • Bail out an insolvent bank as a fiscal decision. Equity and unsecured debt sit with Treasury, the FDIC, and Congress.
  • Guarantee uninsured deposits without the systemic-risk statute and the Secretary’s determination.
  • Make a run stop by promising that venture-capital (VC) depositors are a protected class.

Veto players

FOMC voters; the Treasury Secretary (13(3) approval and the systemic-risk signature); the FDIC Board; Congress; the President, who can attack the Chair in public.

Two historical cases

Each tree is a documented crisis. Take one seat. Walk both files if you can.

Historical reconstruction10–13 March 2023 (reconstruction); officeholder brief current as of September 2026

Par Value Weekend

10–13 March 2023: Silicon Valley Bank has failed. You must decide whether the Federal Reserve lends against securities at par, joins a systemic-risk exception, and still tightens at the next FOMC.

Forks are the kinds of choices the office actually faced. The documented path is labelled in the rationale.

  • — Separate the discount window from a Section 13(3) term facility that values collateral at par.
  • — See the Fed Board’s role in a systemic-risk exception versus Treasury’s legal signature.
  • — Keep the dual mandate in view when a banking shock hits during a hiking cycle.
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Historical reconstruction12–15 September 2008 (reconstruction); officeholder brief current as of September 2026

No Buyer Weekend

12–15 September 2008: Lehman Brothers is out of cash. You must decide whether the Federal Reserve can lend under Section 13(3), whether Treasury will guarantee a sale, and what happens when the United Kingdom blocks Barclays.

Forks are the kinds of choices the office actually faced. The documented path is labelled in the rationale.

  • — Separate a primary dealer from a commercial bank with discount-window access.
  • — See Section 13(3) as a collateralised loan statute, not a fiscal recapitalisation.
  • — Name Treasury and the UK FSA as veto players on a cross-border sale.
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